The Vienna and Mürzsteg Plans, in Theory and Practice
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Fuelled by popular sentiment, but even more so by colonial self-interest, the Great Powers began in late 1902 to formulate a plan for reforms which the Ottomans would be compelled to accept. The first one, known as the Vienna Plan, proved ineffectual and in early October 1903, following the disastrous Ilinden Uprising of August and resulting political intrigue in Europe’s capitals, that Austro-Hungarian and Russian diplomats finally met in Vienna and Mürzsteg to hammer out a real Macedonian reform program.
The program was jointly announced, and was named after its place of agreement- according to British historian Arthur May, “a dismal hunting lodge in Styria” in central Austria. The Mürzsteg agreement asserted that there would be no changes of borders- just as did the similarly ill-fated UN Resolution 1244 that ended the Kosovo War 96 years later.
Both reform plans basically envisioned a Macedonia still ruled by the Ottoman Empire, but which would be a kinder and gentler place to live for its inhabitants. They called for improving the economic and security status of the oppressed Christian populations and for incorporating more of them into state service. Propositions like insurgent amnesties and tax breaks for returning refugees were also made. But those who expected that the reforms would help preserve a very fragile status quo would soon be disappointed.
As in Kosovo today, the interventionist governments sought to put a positive spin on the situation, despite the rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground. In practice, the reforms proved hard to carry out. The international observers in the gendarmes had a delicate role that was almost impossible to perform: they were tasked with reporting on abuses of the Turkish officials, while at the same time remaining dependent upon them for their safety and well-being. They could not execute their mandate effectively because they had only an advisory role and a limited mandate. Their goals under Mürzsteg were to reorganize the gendarmerie and to bring order, safety, and stability. They could only counsel. They could not command.
There were also the inevitable power struggles between the representatives of the Great Powers, which diluted the strength of the mission and ruined its ability to function. Commanding Italian General Emilio Degiorgis sought to maintain “impartiality” in his mandate, but biases were often revealed. The Austrians favored the Albanians, while the Russians favored the Serbs. Germany supported the Ottoman Turkish government. The British shifted during the seven-year interventionist experiment from a position of supporting Ottoman sovereignty to one of a free Macedonia. Throughout, their collective biases and hidden agendas would be a hindrance to the effective implementation of the reforms.
From 1904-1908, the joint military commission continued to meet twice a year, and sent their reports to the Austrian and Russian embassies, who in turn passed them on to the Turkish government. But a low-intensity guerrilla war continued to rage throughout the duration of the Western intervention, and the self-appointed guardians of the moral order remained powerless to stop it.
Indeed, while the Christian population had at first held out high expectations for the reform program, it later felt disappointed, betrayed and even deceived. It became clear that the Great Powers were acting to advance their own interests in Macedonia, and not to achieve any meaningful reform or to help the Christian population.
The 48 officers dispatched to the Macedonian region did however give the Christian population a minor sense of security. The police reforms did improve the quality of the gendarmerie. The actual Western officers in the field carried out their mission in good faith, in spite of its ambiguous and complex character of their mandate. However, they continued to meet with obstruction from the Turkish officials.
The Turkish officials continued to oppose the reforms through obstructionism and delay, through passive resistance and through general inertia. The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, refused to accelerate the pace of the reforms and did everything to discourage their implementation. At first, he believed he could wait out the reforms by employing stalling and delaying tactics. Turkish officials sought to intimidate and pressure Christians from making complaints and from voicing their grievances to the officers. Turkish officials showed bad faith at every turn.
There were, however, exceptions. Some of the best cooperation came from Ottoman officials who were not natives of the Balkans and who could thus act more impartially. The vali of Kosovo, Mahmoud Chevket Pasha, was a native of Baghdad; he actively supported the reforms, as did the commander of the Skopje zone, Osman Fewzi Pasha, a Tartar. The problem with the reforms was that 48 international officers were an inadequate number to monitor the huge area of the three Macedonian vilayets. The Turkish government kept the number of the reorganized gendarmerie intentionally low to minimize their impact and effectiveness.
The introduction of Christians in the gendarmerie, one of the stipulated reforms, was generally not successful. They were undisciplined and unpopular in both Muslim and Christian areas. They were seen as traitors and lackeys by the Christians, and were despised by Muslims who detested the thought of letting Christians controlling them. They were said to be lacking in “moral value” and “political conviction.” In 1907, the fifth year of the reform programme, they made up only 10 percent of the gendarmerie. Christians also were issued gun licenses infrequently, while Muslims were well-armed and carried firearms openly. The reforms did not prevent abuses against Christians or ensure their safety. The abuses of the gendarmes were, however, lessened due to the reforms.
