The Reforms in Detail: Articles and Ambiguities
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As a key part of the international intervention, administrative and judicial reforms in Macedonia were to be carried out. Austro-Hungarian and Russian agents would participate jointly with Turkish forces in securing and maintaining law and order, in the implementation of police reforms, and in tax collection. In those parts of southern Macedonia where the insurgency was fiercest, a new gendarmerie would be created under the command of foreign international officers. Local Macedonians would have a voice in the local government and in the courts of law. Refugees would be allowed to return to their homes and destroyed villages and towns would be rebuilt and reconstructed. All this was, again, in line with the Treaty of Berlin’s 25 year-old instructions. Another clause in the Mürzsteg Program proposed that Macedonia should be subdivided administratively “along lines of nationality.” This would become a highly problematic error of ambiguity, because nationalities at the time were neither distinct nor well-established, and displayed considerable fluidity depending on the local circumstances in the various sub-regions of Macedonia.
Great Power exploitation of this stipulation, especially and most egregiously by Austria-Hungary, ensured that the Albanian-populated areas would be excluded from the reforms, thus ensuring that setting the benchmarks of civilization would be selectively implemented. Indeed, there is a clear line between the disparity codified in 1903 and the failure, one century later, of the latest foreign peacekeepers’ “Standards before Status” program in Kosovo.
Specifically, the Mürzsteg Reform Plan consisted of nine articles. They can be summarized as follows:
1.) Special Civil Agents from Austria-Hungary and Russia were to be appointed to the office of the Ottoman Inspector General, Hilmi Pasha, for two-year terms to accompany him and to call to his attention the needs of the Christian population, report on the abuses of the authorities, send their recommendations to the ambassadors in Constantinople, and report on events in the country. Secretaries and Dragomans were to be provided for the Agents to assist them. The goal of the agents was to supervise the implementation of the reforms and to ascertain the needs of the population.
2.) The Turkish gendarmerie and police was to be reorganized. A foreign general was to assume control of the reorganization of the gendarmerie in the three vilayets. He would be in the service of the Turkish government and could add deputies to his staff, from the military forces of the Great Powers, who would act as instructors, promoters, and supervisors. They would oversee the actions of the Turkish troops towards the population. They could also request additional officers and sub-officers from foreign countries. The failure of the Swedish officers was noted, due to their lack of knowledge of the local conditions and their inability to speak any of the local languages.
3.) As soon as stability was restored, the Turkish government was to modify the administrative divisions of the country to reflect a regular or nature grouping of different nationalities. The Turkish policy was one of gerrymandering the districts and vilayets to ensure Muslim dominance and to pit one nationality or religious or ethnic group against another. The policy was one of Divide et Impera: Divide and Rule. Moreover, in the Ottoman Empire, there were only two divisions, based on religion. There were the Muslims, who ruled, and the Christians, who were the servants. The reform sought to address this.
4.) Administrative and judicial institutions were to be reorganized to include local Christians. Local autonomy was to be encouraged.
5.) Mixed Commissions formed of an equal number of Christians and Muslim delegates were to be established in the main cities of the vilayets to review and examine the political and other crimes committed during the insurgency. The consular representatives of Russia and Austria-Hungary were to participate in these Commissions.
6.) The Turkish government was to provide special funds for the return of refugees who fled to Bulgaria and other regions to their places of origin. Christians who lost their possessions and savings and homes were to be assisted. Houses, churches, and schools destroyed by Turkish forces during the insurgency were to be restored. Commissions would decide how the money was to be distributed, with the participation of prominent Christians in the community. The use of the funds was to be supervised by Russian and Austro-Hungarian consuls.
7.) In Christian villages burned down by Turkish troops and Bashi-bazouk irregulars, the inhabitants were to be returned to their homes and be exempt from paying taxes for one year.
8.) The Turkish government was to reintroduce the February reforms of the Vienna Plan and those reforms which were made necessary subsequently.
9.) The Turkish government was to lay off ilaves, redifs of II class, reserve troops of the Turkish army. The formation of Bashi-bazouk irregular forces was to be absolutely prevented. Most of the “excesses and cruelties” of the insurgency were ascribed to these two units. Not surprisingly, the Turks perceived “the foreign encroachment [to be] a real humiliation.” The program was seen by them as violating the sovereignty of Turkey. The imposition of the Civil Agents was seen as “interference from Russia and Austria in internal affairs.”
The vali of Salonika, Hassen Fehmi Pasha, regarded the program as follows: “Rather than humiliate us in this way it would be worth inciting us simply to evacuate Macedonia.” The announcement of the reforms created “a strong impression” in Constantinople. For Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, it precluded them from having a say in the affairs of the vilayets, while increasing the influence of Austria-Hungary at the expense of Russia.
However, the revolutionaries in the IMRO and the pro-Bulgar Vrhovist Committees rejected the Mürzsteg reforms. They saw these as a stop-gap measure insufficient to achieve any of their goals. Boris Saravov called the program the establishment of “the Austro-Russian protectorate.” Krste Tatarchev called for the recall of Hilmi Pasha, who he regarded as “too docile [in tolerating] massacres.” Despite the failure of the summer offensive in Krusevo, the IMRO did not disarm and continued to solicit funds for a renewed insurgency.
From January to April 1904, the Great Powers set up the international administrative apparatus dictated by the Mürzsteg Plan in Macedonia. In January, Calice and Zinoviev discussed the terms and conditions for the implementation of the reforms with Abdul Hamid in Constantinople. Hamid accepted the nine articles but reserved the right to agree on the practical details of the implementation. His major concern was over articles 1 and 2, because he felt they harmed the sovereignty and prestige of his dwindling empire.
The sultan was able to win the crucial right that Turkish officials be allowed to accompany the Civil Agents on their inspections- thus overseeing the overseers. Tacit intimidation could thus be enforced by the Turkish officials, ensuring that fearful villagers would put on a brave face for the foreigners. The reorganization plan was put under the command of an Italian general, Emilio Degiorgis, who himself was under the command of Sultan Abdul Hamid. The reforms would be overseen by the two Civil Agents, the Italian general, and the chiefs of the military missions from the Great Powers.
