1. Recognition/Definition/Citizenship

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Section 1: Recognition/Definition/Citizenship

Greece is a unitary state. “The official ideology of the Greek State has been built almost exclusively around the concept of a single nation, with a common creed and language. This incontrovertible fact is reflected in, amongst other things, all the constitutions by which the country has been governed in its 160-year history, including the one currently in force” (Stavros, 1996:117). Thus, the Greek state has been acknowledging the existence of only one, religious in character, minority, that of the Muslims of Thrace whose rights have been guaranteed by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. No other minority is acknowledged. The Greek state argues that it fully respects the rights of the Muslim minority, implicitly accepting though past discrimination: “The basic guiding principles of the policy followed by Greek Governments in recent years, vis-a-vis the handling of minority issues have been those of moderation and consensus. This is especially true since 1991, when the Government solemnly reaffirmed the principles of “isonomia” i.e. equality before the Law and “isopoliteia”, equality of civil rights, in the relation between Christians and Moslems. These views are also shared by Non-Governmental Organizations which closely follow developments in the minorities field. The whole issue is being handled as belonging to domestic affairs” (http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/musminen.htm). It need be noted, however, that there is no genuine NGO that shares that view of the government.

Reality is different though. “Minorities existing today in Greece (…) [fall into] two main categories: first, those bearing one major distinctive feature (religion, language, cultural ties) and second, those which are more complex in character, namely presenting more than one major difference with regard to the rest of the population (the majority). In the first category we may clearly include Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses (all religious minorities) and the Arvanites [and the Vlachs] (linguistic minorit[ies]). In the second category we may include all those who are traditionally linked with ethnic origins other than the predominant Hellenic origin: Muslim Turcophones, Pomaks, Gypsies, Slavophones and Jews.” The quote comes from a study by Professor Christos Rozakis, currently vice-president of the European Court of Human Rights and at the time of its publication Deputy Foreign Minister (Rozakis, 1996:101 –we have added the Vlachs whom the author omitted in that paragraph but clearly identified elsewhere in the study, in p. 99). “The category of minorities existing in Greece today are easily discernible, mainly though their collective activities, their distinctive presence in some parts of the country, or even the presentation of their claims before public and other competent for a. What is not easily discernible is the exact number of members belonging to each one of them. This phenomenon is due to the fact that, unlike the 1951 census, more recent censuses have not addressed issue of national/ethnic origin, language and religion. (…) It may be assumed that this attitude of not including questions in recent censuses about even the linguistic and religious preferences of the population is consistent with a more general policy to discourage discussion on issues concerning ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences in Greek society” (Rozakis, 1996:98).

The issue of minorities has remained very sensitive in Greece, as –if not more than- elsewhere in the Balkans. Acknowledging the presence of Turks, let alone Macedonians, in the country is widely perceived as a near-treason, and may lead to castigation, persecution or even prosecution of those who make such arguments. It is characteristic that even most of the -mere handful of- scholars like who mention the presence of such minorities feel compelled to use the terms “Turcophones” or “Slavophones” rather than Turks or Macedonians (Rozakis, op.cit. and Kourtovik, 1997 –the latter is a human rights activist and has even been the lawyer of many minority activists). Or, they call Greece’s neighbor “state of Skopje” (London School of Economics Professor Nikos Mouzelis in “The pluses and minuses of Greek democracy” –”To Vima” 15/8/1999). Just as almost all media, politicians and intellectuals have constantly been referring to the “Albanophones” of Kosovo, even if the Belgrade regime, including Milosevic himself, calls them “Albanians.” In fact, when foreigners use any one of those three “inappropriate terms” they are frequently “corrected” or “edited” –with the use of quotation marks- in the television translation, the newspaper story, or even the scholarly publication. This happens almost always with the term Macedonia and Macedonians, near always with the Turkish minority and frequently with the Kosovo or Macedonia’s Albanians.

This sensitivity became evident in late July 1999, when, suddenly and for the first time in its modern history, there was a debate on the possible modernization of the country’s minority and citizenship policies. Under the impetus of Foreign Minister George Papandreou, a renowned supporter of multiculturalism, public opinion was informed that Greece was finally moving towards the application of the internationally-accepted norms for national minorities. In repeated interviews (Papandreou, 1999a,b&c), Papandreou said that the country had nothing to fear from the right to self-identification of its minority citizens: “If a Greek citizen feels that he belongs to some ethnic group, international treaties allow this. And Greece is a country that respects international agreements. (…) No one challenges the fact that there are [in Greece] many Muslims of Turkish origin. Of course, the [Lausanne] treaties refer to Muslims. If the borders are not challenged, it concerns me little if someone calls himself a Turk, a Bulgarian or a Pomak. (…) Whoever feels he has such a [Macedonian] origin, Greece has nothing to fear from it and I want to stress this is not just my thought. It is a well-established practice that allows the integration of minorities throughout Europe, as well as in other countries like Canada, Australia, and the USA. Such an attitude defuses whatever problems might have existed, allows the real blossoming of democratic institutions, as well as gives these people the feeling that they too are citizens of this country.” At the same time, the Ministry of the Interior leaked to the media a plan to radically change the citizenship policy, so as to allow immigrants, after some years or residence, to qualify for it, without excluding, as was the case until now, those from neighboring countries or of a Muslim faith. Even the thorny issue of allowing the return of ethnic Macedonian political refugees, who fled as a result of the civil war in the late 1940s and have been banned from Greece since then, was to be finally settled. Coincidentally, a few days before the Papandreou statements, a public appeal for the recognition of a Macedonian and a Turkish minority, the unconditional ratification by Parliament of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the respect of these minorities’ rights was made by the three Turkish minority deputies in the Greek Parliament, three Macedonian, seven Turkish and three human rights NGOs (including GHM and MRG-G which initiated the appeal).

The reaction to these three cases showed how, in Greece but probably everywhere else in the Balkans, public opinion but also opinion leaders consider such policies inapplicable or undesirable. First, there was a near unanimous verbally violent reaction to the appeal, enriched with xenophobic and other hate speech and even some defamatory personal attacks against the signatories. Papandreou aptly called these reactions “harsh, an indication of fear and panic.” His statements, as well as the coverage of the attempts to change the citizenship policy, were also met with similar harsh reactions. The reputed as authoritative morning dailies, in their editorials, called the Minister’s statements “a lapse” (pro-opposition “Kathimerini” 30/7) and an attitude of “submissiveness” (pro-government “To Vima” 30/7). The latter elaborated further: “There could not be even one Greek citizen, however conciliatory, ready to even discuss the presence or racial [sic] minorities. The Greek people is one and indivisible. With various religious beliefs that do not however affect the unity of the total population. The government should immediately rectify a lapse, even involuntary, that gestates obvious and less obvious dangers.” While a column by Stavros Lygeros on “The sorcerer’s apprentices” in “Kathimerini” added that “George Papandreou is expressing a whole attitude that seems to prevail in the Simitis government circles. The view that minorities should be recognized, as well as the view that citizenship should be granted to the economic migrants, stems from the same attitude. Basically it is a naive, but nationally dangerous attempt to apply half-baked ideology. With parochial fanaticism they are trying to apply the model of the multicultural society in a national state. Yet Greece is not a country that was created by immigrants, like the United States and Australia, nor is it a former empire, like Britain, which incorporated some of its former subjects. After all, these countries don’t recognize minorities. Greece is the country of an historic nation, which lives in a region full of ethnic prejudice and disputes and which has to face direct threats. That’s why it can’t afford to have sorcerer’s apprentices at the helm.” Many leading politicians called for Papandreou’s resignation while there were even voices which called him a “minister of Ecevit [Turkish PM] and Clinton” [President of the US which is supposed to mastermind the stirring up of minority problems in the Balkans so as to subsequently then exploit them as it did in Kosovo]. Closing the debate, Papandreou gave an accurate albeit optimistic description of the situation: “Greece has gained a new self-confidence and has nothing to fear. The intensity of the opinions expressed is unrelated to the country’s official policy; it rather reflects the perception of society and political parties on minority issues. I am thus glad that a fertile debate on this issue has started.” As NGOs have abundantly documented, this old-fashioned and intolerant perception dominates the daily practice which then runs counter to the, new, official policy. In fact, almost a year later, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has yet to be ratified, while in the meantime Papandreou himself, in an answer to a parliamentary question, partly retreated, by stating that his views on self-identification of minorities were merely his “personal” views (Papandreou, 1999d).